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Abstract
We observed that in a decision model, where individuals have gains in their utilities
by making the same decisions as the other individuals of the same group, the pure
Nash equilibria are cohesive. However if there are frictions among individuals of the
same group, then there will be disparate Nash equilibria where the group is disrupted
and different elements will make different decisions. Finally, we did a full analysis
of a resort-tourist game that might become a paradigm to understand comercial
interactions between individuals that have to choose among different offers of public
or private services and care about the other individuals choices.
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Introduction
The main goal in Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action theories, as developed in the
works of Ajzen (see [1]) and Baker (see [2]), is to understand and predict the way
individuals turn intentions into behaviors. Almeida-Cruz-Ferreira-Pinto (see [3, 4, 5])
developed a game theoretical model for reasoned action, inspired by the works of
J. Cownley and M. Wooders (see [6]). Here, we study the game theoretical model
presented in [3] that we call the decision model.
In the decision model, the individuals will have to make decisions according to their
preferences. The preferences have the interesting feature of taking into account not
only how much the individuals like or dislike a certain decision, but also the other
individuals’ decisions. We consider that individuals with the same utility functions
belong to a same group. We say that a group is cohesive if every individual has a
gain in his utility when other individuals of the same group make the same decision
as his. Almeida et al. [3] proved that all the individuals of a cohesive group make
the same decision at a pure Nash equilibria. We extended this concept and so we
say that a pure strategy is cohesive if all the individuals belonging to a same group
will make the same decision. Hence, by Almeida et al. [3], if all groups are cohesive
then all pure Nash are cohesive strategies. In the first chapter we find the cohesive
thresholds that characterize the space of all parameters where the cohesive strategies
are Nash equilibria (see [7]). Mousa et al. [8] show, for a model with two groups and
two decisions, the existence of disparate Nash equilibria, where individuals in a same
group can make different decisions at certain Nash equilibria. Here we extend these
results to the general decision model discussed in this work. We present sufficient and
necessary conditions that guarantee the existence of disparate Nash equilibria.
In the second chapter we do a first discussion of a resort-tourist game with two stages.
In the first stage the resorts decide their prices and in the second stage the tourists
(individuals) choose their favorite resort. Hence the second stage game is similar to
the game discussed in the first chapter. We do a full discussion of the mixed Nash
5
6equilibria in this case. Finally, we study and fully characterize the Nash equilibria
and subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for the resort-tourist game, when resorts use
pure strategies. We link the equilibria with the relevant parameters of the model.
These analysis will be the basis for future studies of the impacts of different policies
of investment and publicity under uncertainties.
Chapter 1
Decision Model: general case.
The decision model hasN types T = {t1, t2, . . . , tN} of individuals. Let It = {1, . . . , nt}
be the set of all individuals with type t ∈ T and set I = ⊔Nt=1 It . The individual i ∈ I
has to make a decision d ∈ D = {d1, . . . , dM}.
The type function t : I → T associates to each individual i his type t(i) ∈ T. Hence
t−1(t) determines the group of all individuals i with type t = t(i). We describe the
pure decision of the individuals by a strategy map S : I → D that associates to each
individual i ∈ I his decision S(i) ∈ D. Let the preference decision coordinates ωdt
indicate how much an individual i with type t(i) likes or dislikes, to make decision
d = S(i). The preference decision coordinates indicate for each type of individuals
the decision that the individuals prefer, i.e. the taste type of the individuals (see
[3, 12, 6, 5, 10]). Hence, the preference decision matrix Ω = Ω(S) ∈ RNM is given by
Ω =
ω
1
1 . . . ω
M
1
...
. . .
...
ω1N . . . ω
M
N
 .
Let the preference neighbors coordinates αdtt′ indicate how much an individual with
type t who decides d likes or dislikes that an individual with type t′ makes decision d.
The preference neighbors coordinates indicate, for each type of individuals who make
decision d, whom they prefer, or do not prefer, to share that decision with, i.e. the
crowding type of the individuals (see [3, 12, 6, 5, 10]).
Given a strategy S, let L(S) be the strategic decision matrix whose coordinates ldt =
ldt (S) indicate the number of individuals with type t who make decision d
7
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L(S) =
 l
1
1 . . . l
M
1
...
. . .
...
l1N . . . l
M
N
 .
Let S be the space of all strategies S. Let L = {L(S) ∈ RNM : S ∈ S} be the set of
all strategic decision matrices L(S). The auxiliar utility function
U : T×D× L→ R
is given by
U(t; d, L) = ωdt − αdtt +
N∑
t′=1
αdtt′l
d
t′ .
The utility function U : I× S→ R is
U(i;S) = U(t(i);S(i);L(S)) .
We observe that, if two individuals i1 and i2 with the same type t(i) = t(i
′) make the
same decision d = S(i) = S(i′), then their utilities U(i;S) and U(i;S) are equal, i.e.
U(i;S) = U(t; d, L(S)) = U(j;S).
Given a strategy S∗, for every i ∈ I and d ∈ D \ {S(i)}, we define the strategy S∗i→d
by S∗i→d(i) = d and S
∗
i→d(j) = S
∗(j), for every j ∈ I \ {i}.
A strategy S∗ : I× S→ D is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
U(i;S∗) ≥ U(i;S∗i→d)
for every i ∈ I and d ∈ D \ {S(i)}. The Nash domain N(S) of a strategy S ∈ S is the
set of all preference decision matrices Ω ∈ RNM with the property that S is a Nash
equilibrium.
We define the relative decision preference coordinate x(t; d, d′) of an individual i with
type t = t(i) by
x(t; d, d′) = ωdt − ωd
′
t
for every d, d′ ∈ D with d 6= d′.
Given a strategy S, for every individual i ∈ I with type t = t(i) and for every d ∈ D \
{S(i)}, the preference threshold T (i→ d) of the relative decision preference coordinate
x(t; d, S(i)) is defined by
T (i→ d) = T (t(i);S(i), d) = −αS(i)tt +
N∑
t′=1
(
α
S(i)
tt′ l
S(i)
t′ − αdtt′ldt′
)
. (1.0.1)
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Remark 1 (Transitive and reflexive thresholds properties). For every i1, i2, i3 ∈ I
satisfying t(i1) = t(i2) = t(i3) and S(i1) 6= S(i2), S(i2) 6= S(i3) and S(i3) 6= S(i1), the
following identities hold:
T (i1 → S(i2)) + T (i2 → S(i3))− T (i1 → S(i3)) = −αS(i2)tt (1.0.2)
T (i1 → S(i2)) + T (i2 → S(i1)) = −
(
α
S(i1)
tt + α
S(i2)
tt
)
(1.0.3)
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1.1 Cohesive Nash equilibria
A cohesive strategy1 S : I → D is a strategy in which all individuals with the same
type prefer to make the same decision, i.e. for every t ∈ T , S(t−1(t)) is a singleton.
We note that there are NM cohesive strategies.
Theorem 1. A cohesive strategy S is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
x(t(i); d, S(i)) ≤ T (i→ d) (1.1.1)
for every individual i ∈ I and every decision d ∈ D \ {S(i)}.
Therefore, the Nash domain N(S) of a cohesive strategy S is non-empty and coincides
with the half-hyper-plan consisting of all the preference decision matrices in the space
RNM satisfying inequalities (1.1.1).
Proof. A cohesive strategy S is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, for every individual
i ∈ I and every decision d ∈ D \ {S(i)},
U(i;S) ≥ U(i;Si→d).
Let c = S(i) and t = t(i) and note that lct = nt and l
d
t = 0. Substituting the values in
the utilities, we obtain
ωct + α
c
tt (nt − 1) +
N∑
t′=1
t′ 6=t
αctt′l
c
t′ ≥ ωdt +
N∑
t′=1
t′ 6=t
αdtt′l
d
t′ .
Rearranging the terms of the last inequality, we get
ωdt − ωct ≤ −αctt −
N∑
t′=1
(
αdtt′l
d
t′ − αctt′lct′
)
.
1or equivalently herd strategy
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1.2 Disparate Nash equilibria
In this section, we study the existence of equilibria where individuals of the same type
might be making different decisions.
We say that one type t ∈ T of individuals is splitted among different decisions, if there
is at least one individual i with type t(i) = t ∈ T deciding d = S(i) and another
individual i′ with the same type t(i′) = t not deciding d, meaning S(i′) 6= d.
Definition 1. A disparate strategy is a strategy with at least one type of individuals
splitted among different decisions.
Therefore, the herd effect is broken for a disparate strategy at least for one type of
individuals. We note that a pure strategy is either a cohesive or a disparate strategy.
The set Dt(S) of splitted decisions of a strategy S is
Dt(S) = {{d1, d2} : S(i) = d1 6= d2 = S(j) with t(i) = t(j) = t}.
Given a strategy S, for every individual i ∈ I and for every decision d ∈ D \ {S(i)},
we define the interval I(i→ d) = I(t(i);S(i), d) as follows:
1. if {S(i), d} /∈ Dt(i)(S) then
I(i→ d) = (−∞, T (i→ d)]
2. if {S(i), d} ∈ Dt(i)(S) then there is j ∈ I with t(j) = t such that S(j) = d and
I(i→ S(j)) = [−T (i→ S(j)), T (j → S(i))]
Therefore, given a strategy S, for all individuals i, j ∈ I with the same type t(i) =
t(j) = t and S(i) 6= S(j) the center of the interval I(i→ S(j)) is
c(i→ S(j)) = c(t(i);S(i), d) = T (j → S(i))− T (i→ S(j))
2
.
Moreover, by Remark 1, the length of the interval I(i→ S(j)) is
|I(i→ S(j))| = −(αS(i)tt + αS(j)tt ).
Hence,
I(i→ S(j)) =
[
α
S(i)
tt + α
S(j)
tt
2
+ c(i→ S(j)), −(α
S(i)
tt + α
S(j)
tt )
2
+ c(i→ S(j))
]
.
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Theorem 2. A pure stategy S is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, for every individual
i ∈ I and for every decision d ∈ D \ {S(i)}
x(t(i);S(i), d) ∈ I(i→ d). (1.2.1)
The set Dt of negative relative influences is
Dt = {{d1, d2} ⊂ D : αd1tt + αd2tt ≤ 0}.
We say that a strategy S satisfies the disparate property if, for every type t ∈ T,
Dt(S) ⊂ Dt.
Hence, putting together equality (1.0.3) and the inequality characterizing the set of
negative relative influences, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If a disparate strategy S ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium then S satisfies the
disparate property.
Proof. The disparate strategy S : I× S→ D is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
U(i;S) ≥ U(i;Si→d)
for every i ∈ I and d ∈ D \ {S(i)}. Letting ldt = ldt (S) and c = S(i) and t = t(i), we
get
ωct − αctt +
N∑
t′=1
αctt′l
c
t′ ≥ ωdt +
N∑
t′=1
αdtt′l
d
t′ .
Rearranging the terms, the previous inequality is equivalent to
x(t; c, d) ≥ αctt −
N∑
t′=1
(
αctt′l
c
t′ − αdtt′ldt′
)
.
Hence, U(i;S) ≥ U(i;Si→d) if, and only if,
x(t; c, d) ≥ −T (i→ d). (1.2.2)
If {c, d} /∈ Dt(S) then (1.2.2) is equivalent to (1.2.1). On the other hand, if {c, d} ∈
Dt(S) then there is j ∈ I with t = t(j) such that S(j) = d. Thus, similarly, we have
that U(j;S) ≥ U(j;Sj→c) is equivalent to
x(t; d, c) ≥ −T (j → c)
Noting that x(t; c, d) = −x(t; d, c), we get
T (j → c) ≤ x(t; c, d) ≤ −T (i→ d)
that is equivalent to (1.2.1).
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For every t ∈ T, let
d∗t = arg max{S(i)∈D:t(i)=t}
{αdtt} and α∗t = min{0, αd
∗
t
tt }. (1.2.3)
Let i∗ ∈ I be such that S(i∗) = d∗t . Given a strategy S, for every t ∈ T and for every
individual i ∈ It with {S(i), d∗t} ∈ Dt(S), we define
J(t;S(i), d∗t ) =
[
α
S(i)
tt + α
d∗t
tt − α∗t
2
+ c(i→ d∗t )),
−(αS(i)tt + αd
∗
t
tt − α∗t )
2
+ c(i→ d∗t )
]
.
and
g(t;S(i∗), S(i)) =
[
α
d∗t
tt + α
S(i)
tt − α∗t
2
+ c(i∗ → S(i))), −(α
d∗t
tt + α
S(i)
tt − α∗t )
2
+ c(i∗ → S(i))
]
.
Theorem 3. Let S be a disparate strategy. If for every individual i ∈ I
x(t(i);S(i), S(i∗)) ∈ J(t(i);S(i), d∗t(i)),
then S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For every t ∈ T with Dt(S) 6= ∅, and for every individuals i, j ∈ It with
{S(i), S(j)} ∈ Dt(S), letting c = S(i), d = S(j), we have that
x(t; c, d) = x(t; c, d∗t ) + x(t; d
∗
t , d) (1.2.4)
Let i∗ be the individual with type t such that S(i∗) = d∗t , where d
∗
t is as in (1.2.3).
Since x(t; c, d∗t ) ∈ J(t; c, d∗t ) and x(t; d∗t , d) ∈ g(t; d∗t , d), consider the deviations from
the centers of the respective intervals, given by
c = |x(t; c, d∗t )− c(i→ d∗t )| and d = |x(t; d∗t , d)− c(i∗ → d)| .
This deviatons are majorated
c ≤
∣∣∣∣∣αctt + αd
∗
t
tt − α∗t
2
∣∣∣∣∣ and d ≤
∣∣∣∣∣αdtt + αd
∗
t
tt − α∗t
2
∣∣∣∣∣
Thus, we obtain
c + d ≤
∣∣∣∣αdtt + αdtt2 + αd∗ttt − α∗t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣αdtt + αdtt2
∣∣∣∣ .
We now note that
c(i→ d∗t ) + c(i∗ → d) = c(i→ d).
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Therefore using (1.2.4)
x(t; c, d) = c(i→ d) + c + d
implying
x(t; c, d) ∈ I(i→ d).
Hence, by Theorem 2, S is a Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 2
Tourists and Resorts Game
We consider a two stage game where there are two types of players: tourists and
resorts. In the first stage resorts decide simultaneously their prices, and in the second
stage tourists observe prices, and choose one of the resorts. As a clarifying example
we take a group of n ∈ N tourists having to choose between spending holidays in a
Beach or in a Mountain resort. We denote the set of players by I = R∪T, where the
set of resorts is R = {B,M} and the set of tourists is T = {1, . . . , n}.
The tourists set of actions is the resorts. After a pair of prices has been set on the first
stage of the game, the tourists choice will depend on their relative preferences and the
influence they have on each other.
The parameters appearing in the tourists’ utility function and the utility function itself
follow from the model presented in the first chapter. Here we consider just one type of
tourists facing a dichotomous decision, and we add the new feature of prices entering
the utility function. Thus, for a given resort R ∈ R, the parameters influencing a
tourist decision are:
θR - the price set by resort R;
ωR - how much a tourist likes or dislikes resort R
αR - how much a tourist likes to be with other tourist in resort R;
The parameters regarding tourists preferences and influences are common knowledge
for all players. The outcome of the game is the pair of prices and the tourists allocation.
We characterize game equilibria using the notions of Nash equilibrium and subgame-
15
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perfect Nash equilibrium. We allow for two different cases: tourists reaction to price
changes depends on which resort is changing its price; tourists reaction depends only
on the price difference1. In the latter case, if the average influence (αB + αM) is
positive then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are either monopolies or competitive
equilibria where resorts have zero profits. When there are negative average influences,
non-monopolistic and non-zero profit subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. We find
the prices and preferences for which these equilibria occur.
1A different interpretation may be that resorts have different understandings of how the market
will respond if they deviate.
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2.1 Tourists Nash allocations
We describe the tourists decisions by a strategy map S : {1, . . . , n} → [0, 1] that
assignes to each individual i his choice probability. Namely, an individual chooses
resort B with probability S(i) = pBi and resort M with probability p
M
i = 1 − S(i).
The set of all tourists strategies is
S(T ) =
{
(pB1 , p
B
2 , . . . , p
B
n ) : 0 ≤ pBi ≤ 1 and pBi + pMi = 1
}
.
Given the tourists strategy S(θB, θM) = (p
B
1 , . . . , p
B
n ) ∈ S(T ), we define the beach
market share SB and the mountain market share SM by
SB(θB, θM) =
n∑
i=0
pBi and SM(θ1, θ2) =
n∑
i=0
(1− pBi ) = N − SB(θB, θM).
Let SB(i) = S(i) and SM(i) = 1− S(i). The utility Ui : S(T )→ R of each individual
i is
Ui(S) =
∑
R∈{B,M}
pRi (−θR + ωR + αR(SR(θB, θM)− pRi )).
Let A = αB + αM . We say the tourists like to meet each other in the same resort if
A > 0, and that the tourists do not like to meet each other in the same resort if A ≤ 0.
The free price relative preference for the tourists is xF = ωB − ωM ∈ R. The price
relative preference for the tourists is
x = θM − θB + xF ∈ R. (2.1.1)
Let the relative preference thresholds be T (l) = −Al + αM(n− 1) and let the auxiliar
relative preference thresholds be T ′(l) = T (l − 1) with respect to the relative price
preference x.
An l-strategy S ∈ S(T ) is a strategy (i) with l individuals i opting to choose resort
B with probability S(i) = 1 and (ii) with n − l individuals i opting to choose resort
M with probability 1 − S(i) = 1. Hence, SB = l. The pure Nash equilibria are the
union of all l-strategies that are Nash equilibria. We note that if one l-strategy S is
a Nash equilibrium for some price relative preference x, then all l-strategies are Nash
equilibria for the same x. The following two lemmas follow from the theorems 1 and
2 in chapter 1.
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Lemma 1 (Pure Nash equilibria for tourists that like to meet each other). Let A > 0.
(i) An l-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, l = 0 or l = n.
(ii) If a 0-strategy is a Nash equilibrium then x ∈ (−∞, T (0)].
(iii) If an n-strategy is a Nash equilibrium then x ∈ [T ′(n),+∞).
Proof. Since A > 0 the set of negative relative influences is empty (chapter 1, page
12). The proof then follows from corollary 1 and theorem 1.
When A > 0, we have T ′(n) < T (0). Hence, if x ∈ [T ′(n), T (0)] then a pure Nash
equilibrium can be either a 0-strategy or an n-strategy.
Lemma 2 (Pure Nash equilibria for tourists that do not like to meet each other). Let
A ≤ 0.
(i) A 0-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, x ∈ (−∞, T (0)].
(ii) An n-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, x ∈ [T ′(n),+∞).
(iii) An l-strategy is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, x ∈ [T ′(l), T (l)].
Proof. Follows from theorem 2.
We note that T (l) = T ′(l + 1). Hence, when A ≤ 0, if x ∈ R \ ∪n−1l=0 {T (l)} then there
is a unique pure tourist strategy that is a Nash equilibrium; if x = T (l) then a pure
Nash equilibrium can be either an l-strategy or an l + 1-strategy.
An (l, k) strategy S ∈ S(T ) is a strategy (i) with l individuals i opting to choose resort
B with probability S(i) = 1, (ii) with n− (l+ k) individuals i opting to choose resort
M with probability 1 − S(i) = 1, and (iii) with k ≥ 1 individuals i opting to choose
resort B with some probability 0 ≤ S(i) = pS ≤ 1. We call pS the (l, k) probability
of the strategy S. Hence, SB = l + kpS. A strict (l, k) strategy S ∈ S(T ) is an (l, k)
strategy with (l, k)-probability 0 < pS < 1. Hence, l and l+ k strategies are contained
in the (l, k) strategies but not in the strict (l, k) strategies. We note that if one (l, k)
strategy S is a Nash equilibrium for some price relative preference x then all (l, k)
strategies are Nash equilibria for the same x. Let N(T ;x) be the set of all tourists’
strategies that are Nash equilibria for some price relative preference x. The results
below characterize the mixed Nash equilibria, and a more general version is proved in
[8].
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Lemma 3 (Mixed Nash equilibria for tourists that like to meet each other). Let A > 0.
(i) A strict mixed strategy is a Nash equilibria if, and only if, the strategy is of the
type (l, k) = (0, n) and x ∈ (T ′(n), T (0)).
(ii) Furthermore, the triple (0, n;x) uniquely determines
SB = l +
k(x− T (0))
−A(n− 1) , pS =
x− T (0)
−A(n− 1) and SB − pS =
x− T (0)
−A .
Theorem 4 (Mixed Nash equilibria for tourists that do like to meet each other). Let
A ≤ 0.
(i) The mixed Nash equilibria are the union of all (l, k)-strategies that are Nash
equilibria.
(ii) An (l, k) strategy is a mixed Nash equilibria if, and only if, x ∈ [T (l), T ′(l + k)].
(iii) Furthermore, the triple (l, k;x) uniquely determines
SB = l +
k(x− T (l))
−A(k − 1) , pS =
x− T (l)
−A(k − 1) and SB − pS =
x− T (0)
−A .
The results above concerning Nash equilibria are now summarized, characterizing the
possible second stage Nash market shares for resorts.
The horizontal market share fibers are
HB0 = {(x, 0) : x ≤ T (0)} ; HBn = {(x, n) : x ≥ T ′(n)}
HBl = {(x, l) : T ′(l) ≤ x ≤ T (l)}.
The global horizontal market share fiber is HB =
⋃n
l HBl . The vertical market share
fibers are
VBl = {(T (l), y) : l ≤ y ≤ l + 1}.
The global vertical market share fiber is VB =
⋃n
l VBl . Let yl,k be the straight-line
given by
yl,k(x) = l +
k(x− T (l))
−A(k − 1) .
The oblique market share fibers are
OBl,k = {(x, yl,k(x)) : T (l) ≤ x ≤ T ′(l + k)}.
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The global oblique market share fiber is OB =
⋃
l,k≤nOBl,k. If A ≤ 0 the beach market
share fiber FB is
FAB = HB ∪ VB ∪ OB.
If A > 0 the beach market share fiber FB is
FAB = HB0 ∪HBn ∪ OB0,n.
The mountain market share fiber FM is the set of all points (x, y) ∈ R2 with the
property that (x, n − y) ∈ FB. In figure 2.1 it is depicted the market share fiber for
the case where A > 0. In figure 2.2 it is depicted the market share fiber for the case
where A < 0 and there are n = 6 tourists.
Corollary 2 (Geometry of the mixed Nash equilibria). Let A ≤ 0. There is a well
defined correspondence between the Nash strategies of the beach Nash domain and the
points on the beach market share fiber
S(θB, θM) ∈ N(T ;x)⇔ (x, SB(θB, θM)) ∈ FB
with the following properties:
(i) An l tourist strategy S(θB, θM) is Nash if, and only if, (x, SB(θB, θM)) ∈ HBl .
(ii) An (l, 1) tourist strategy S(θB, θM) is Nash if, and only if, (x, SB(θB, θM)) ∈ VBl .
(iii) An (l, k) tourist strategy S(θB, θM) is Nash if, and only if, (x, SB(θB, θM)) ∈ OBl,k
with k ≥ 2.
The oblique line segment OBl,k starts at the corner (T (l), yl,k(T (l))) formed by the right
end of the horizontal line segment HBl and the bottom end of the vertical line segment
V Bl . The oblique line segment O
B
l,k ends at the corner (T
′(l+k), yl,k(T ′(l+k))) formed
by the left end of the horizontal line segment HBl+k and the top end of the vertical line
segment V Bl+k. Every oblique line segment O
B
l,k crosses the interior of the horizontal line
segments HBl+j and the interior of the vertical line segments V
B
l+j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
If l < l′ and l + k < l′ + k′ then the oblique line segment OBl,k and O
B
l′,k′ do not cross
each other and OBl,k is on the left hand side of O
B
l′,k′ , i.e. y
−1
l,k (y) ≤ y−1l′,k′(y) for every
l ≤ y ≤ l + k.
Lemma 4 (Geometry of the beach market share fiber). Let A ≤ 0. If l′ ≤ l and
k′ ≤ k then the oblique line segments OBl,k and OBl′,k′ cross at the point
(x(l, k; l′, k′), y(l, k; l′, k′)) ∈ [T (l), T ′(l′ + k′)]× [l, l′ + k′]
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given by
x(l, k; l′, k′) =
−A(k − 1)(l − l′)
(k′ − k) + T (l) =
−A(k′ − 1)(l − l′)
(k′ − k) + T (l
′)
and
y(l, k; l′, k′) = l +
k(l − l′)
(k′ − k) = l
′ +
k′(l − l′)
(k′ − k)
y(l, k; l′, k′) = l + k +
k(l + k − l′ − k′)
(k′ − k) = l
′ + k′ +
k′(l + k − l′ − k′)
(k′ − k) .
Before the crossing point, OBl,k is on the right hand side of O
B
l′,k′, and after the crossing
point, OBl,k is on the left hand side of O
B
l′,k′.
Proof. Note that if a crossing point of two oblique line segments occurs, then A 6= 0
and for those segments k > 1. The crossing point is determined by
l +
k(x− T (l))
−A(k − 1) = yl,k(x) = yl′,k′(x) = l
′ +
k′(x− T (l′))
−A(k′ − 1) .
Hence,
−A(k − 1)(k′ − 1)l+ (k′ − 1)k(x− T (l)) = −A(k − 1)(k′ − 1)l′ + (k − 1)k′(x− T (l′)).
Thus,
(k′ − k)x = A(k − 1)(k′ − 1)(l − l′) + (k′ − 1)kT (l)− (k − 1)k′T (l′).
Since,
T (l) = −Al + αM(n− 1)
we get
(k′ − k)x = −A(k′ − 1)l + A(k − 1)l′ + (k′ − k)αM(n− 1).
Therefore,
x =
−A(k′ − 1)l + A(k − 1)l′
(k′ − k) + T (0)
or, equivalently,
x =
−A(k − 1)(l − l′)
(k′ − k) + T (l)
Hence,
yl,k(x) = l +
k(x− T (l))
−A(k − 1) = l +
k(l − l′)
(k′ − k)
or, equivalently,
y(l, k; l′, k′) = l + k +
k(l + k − l′ − k′)
(k′ − k) = l
′ + k′ +
k′(l + k − l′ − k′)
(k′ − k) .
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Figure 2.1: The beach market share fiber for the case when A > 0.
CHAPTER 2. TOURISTS AND RESORTS GAME 23
6
3
4
5
2
1
HB
VB
OB
SB
1
HB
VB
OB
SB
x
1
HB
VB
OB
SB
1
HB
VB
OB
SB
1
T(0) T(1) T(2) T(3) T(4) T(5)
Figure 2.2: The beach market share fiber for the case when A < 0 and there are n = 6
tourists.
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2.2 Resorts profit
In this section we analyze some consequences for resorts, arising from the existence of
multiple Nash equilibria of the second stage game for the same pair of prices.
The profit ΠB : S(R)→ R of the beach resort is
ΠB(θB;S(θB, θM)) = θBSB(θB, θM).
The profit ΠM : S(R)→ R of the mountain resort is
ΠM(θB;S(θB, θM)) = θMSM(θB, θM).
The case A < 0 is particularly relevant in this setting, since the existence of multiple
Nash equilibria in the second stage, for the same pair of prices, poses a problem as
to which should be the strategy chosen by resorts on the first stage, given a relative
price preference x. Namely we can ask: if the resorts do not know what equilibria will
occur, is it possible to know what are the resorts’ best responses and what are the
resorts strategies leading to game equilibria? Before we address this question we will
study the set of second stage equilibria N(T, x), given a pair of prices and the free
price relative preferences xF . Recall that x = xF − θB + θM . Throughout this section
we will assume A < 0.
By the properties of the fiber space we know that for every Nash equilibrium S ∈
N(T, x) there is a unique pS associated to each (l, k) strategy. Therefore we have
an order of the Nash equilibria in this set associated to their probability, pmin ≤
· · · ≤ pS ≤ · · · ≤ pMax. The profit of resorts will depend on the market share fiber
equilibrium that will be chosen by the tourists.
By theorem 4
SB − pS = (x− T (0))/(−A)
and so SB − pS does not depend upon the tourists strategy but only on the relative
price preference x. Let the tourists strategy free fibers TSFB and TSFM of resorts B
and M , respectively, be given by
TSFB =
{(
x,
x− T (0)
−A
)
: x ∈ [T (0), T ′(n)]
}
(2.2.1)
TSFM =
{(
x,
T ′(n)− x
−A
)
: x ∈ [T (0), T ′(n)]
}
(2.2.2)
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Figure 2.3: A zooming of the fiber space for A < 0, ilustrating the multiplicity of
equilibria in the set N(T, x∗).
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Figure 2.4: The TSF -fibers.
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Let the tourists strategy free profit (TSF − profit) of resort B and M be
ΠB(θB, θM ;x) = θB · (SB − pS) = θB
(
x− T (0)
−A
)
(2.2.3)
ΠM(θB, θM ;x) = θM · (SM − (1− pS)) = θM
(
n− 1− x− T (0)−A
)
(2.2.4)
We observe that the TSF -profit function does not depend upon the tourists strategy,
but only on the relative price preference x. For a given tourists strategy, with strategy
probability pS, the resorts’ profits are
ΠB(θB;S(θB, θM)) = ΠB(θB, θM ;x) + θBpS. (2.2.5)
ΠM(θr;S(θB, θM)) = ΠM(θB, θM ;x) + θM(1− pS). (2.2.6)
Hence, the order of the equilibria associated with their strategy probability induces
the same order on the profits of the set N(T, x) given by
ΠB(θB, θM ;x) ≤ ΠB(pmin) ≤ · · · ≤ ΠB(pS) ≤ · · · ≤ ΠB(pMax) ≤ ΠB(θB, θM ;x) + θB
(2.2.7)
The profits ΠB(θB, θM ;x) and ΠM(θB, θM ;x) associated to the TSF fibers give the
lower and upper bound in relation 2.2.7.
Definition 2. A TSF Nash equilibrium is the pair of prices (θB, θM) that are Nash
equilibrium with respect to the TSF -profit.
Lemma 5. A TSF Nash equilibrium is characterized by
(i) the TSF best response price θ∗B of resort B
θ∗B(θM ;xF ) =
θM + xF + T (0)
2
.
(ii) the TSF best response price θ∗M of resort M
θ∗M(θB;xF ) =
−A(n− 1) + θB + T (0)− xF
2
(iii) the TSF Nash equilibrium prices are
θ∗B =
xF + T (n− 1) + 2T (0)
3
θ∗M =
T (0) + 2T (n− 1)− xF
3
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Proof. Using equations 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 and x = xF − θB + θM , TSF -profit functions
become
ΠB(θB, θM ;x) = (−A)−1θB (−θB + θM + xF − T (0)) (2.2.8)
ΠM(θr;S(θB, θM)) = θM
(
n− 1− −θB + θM + xF − T (0)−A
)
. (2.2.9)
For resort B we have
Π′B = (−A)−1(−θ2B + θB(θM + xF − T (0))
therefore the best response is
θ∗B =
θM + xF + T (0)
2
.
For resort M
Π′M =
(
n− 1− −θB + xF − T (0)−A
)
− 2θM(−A)−1
hence the best response is
θ∗M =
−A(n− 1) + θB + T (0)− xF
2
Using both responses we obtain the equilibrium.
As depicted in figure 2.5, let
m(x∗) = bSB − pSc =
⌊
x∗ − T (0)
−A
⌋
∈ {0, . . . , n};
and q(x∗) = x
∗−T (0)
−A −m(x∗) ∈ [0, 1]. We call m(x∗) the closest threshold index and
q(x∗) the threshold distance. This location parameters allow us to characterize, given
x∗ the set N(T, x∗).
Theorem 5 (Regularity paradox). Let A < 0 and q(x∗) ∈ [0, 1). Consider the Nash
equilibria N(T, x∗) and the resort’s B profit restricted to these tourists Nash equilibria.
(i) If q(x∗) ≥ 1/(m(x∗)+1) then the tourists Nash equilibrium that yields the highest
profit for resort B is the mixed (0,m(x∗) + 1) strategy;
(ii) If q(x∗) ≤ 1/(m(x∗)+1) then the tourists Nash equilibrium that yields the highest
profit for resort B is the pure m(x∗) strategy;
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Figure 2.5: Geometric ilustration of m(x∗) and q(x∗).
(iii) If q(x∗) ≤ (n −m(x∗))/(n −m(x∗) + 1) then the tourists Nash equilibrium that
yields the lowest profit for resort B is the mixed (m(x∗) − 1, n − m(x∗) + 1)
strategy;
(iv) If q(x∗) ≥ (n −m(x∗))/(n −m(x∗) + 1) then the tourists Nash equilibrium that
yields the lowest profit for resort B is the pure m(x∗) strategy.
Remark 2. Observe that for every x ∈ R
1/(m(x) + 1) ≤ (n−m(x))/(n−m(x) + 1).
Thus, no contradiction arises from lemma 5.
Proof. Given x∗, let m = m(x∗) and q = q(x∗). Recall that T (l) = −Al+αM · (n− 1),
we note that
T (m− 1)− qA = x∗ = T (l)− A(k − 1)pS
For each (l, k) strategy with k 6= 1 and S ∈ N(T, x∗), using the above relation, we get
pS =
m− l − 1 + q
k − 1 . (2.2.10)
With pS ∈ (0, 1) and k+l ≤ n. Hence, l ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1} and k ∈ {m−l+1, . . . , n−l}.
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If k = 1 then q = 0 ∨ q = 1, and any probability pS results in equilibrium, hence the
higher profit is associated to pS = 1.
Suppose k > 1. By equation 2.2.10, the maximum profit of a Nash equilibrium S ∈
N(T, x) is an (l, k) strategy that maximizes pS = (m − l − 1 + q)/(k − 1) < 1. The
minimum k is m− l + 1. Therefore,
l∗ = arg max
{
m− 1− l + q
m− l + 1− 1
}
.
Hence l∗ = 0 and k∗ = m+ 1.
Using a similar argument, the equilibrium with smallest profit is given by
l = arg min
{
m− 1− l + q
n− l − 1
}
.
Hence l = m− 1, k = n−m+ 1.
Thus we have found the strict mixed equilibrium yielding the highest and lowest profits.
Now we need to compare them with the profits associated to the pure equilibrium in
N(T, x∗), when l = m and k = 0 or l = m− 1, k = 1 and pS = 1.
Recall that SB = l + kpS, hence we have that the strict mixed equilibrium for the
(0,m+ 1) strategy still yields the highest profit when
(m+ 1)pS > m
Using equation (2.2.10) for pS, we get the following condition
q > 1/(m+ 1)
The strict mixed equilibrium for the (m− 1, n−m+ 1) strategy still yields the lowest
profit when
m− 1 + (n−m+ 1)pS < m
Using again equation (2.2.10), we get the following condition
q < (n−m)/(n−m+ 1)
Which concludes the proof.
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2.3 Resorts Nash prices
A resort-tourist strategy ((θ′B, θ
′
M);S(θB, θM)) is (i) a price strategy θ
′
B ≥ 0 for the
beach resort and a price strategy θ′M ≥ 0 for the mountain resort, and (ii) a strategy
S(θB, θM) ∈ S(T ) for the tourists for all admissible resorts’ prices. Let S(R) be the
set of all resort-tourist strategies. The profit ΠB : S(R)→ R of the beach resort is
ΠB(θ
′
B;S(θ
′
B, θ
′
M)) = θ
′
BSB(θ
′
B, θ
′
M).
The profit ΠM : S(R)→ R of the mountain resort is
ΠM(θ
′
B;S(θ
′
B, θ
′
M)) = θ
′
MSM(θ
′
B, θ
′
M).
The beach resort best response price θ∗B to the price θM of the mountain resort is
θ∗B(θM) = arg max
θB
{ΠB(θB;S(θB, θM))}. (2.3.1)
The mountain resort best response price θ∗M to the price θB of the beach resort is
θ∗M(θB) = arg max
θM
{ΠM(θB;S(θB, θM))}. (2.3.2)
A resort-tourist strategy ((θ∗B, θ
∗
M);S(θB, θM)) is a Nash resort-tourist equilibrium if
S(θ∗B, θ
∗
M) ∈ N(T, x∗)
and
θ∗B(θ
∗
M) = θ
∗
B and θ
∗
M(θ
∗
B) = θ
∗
M ,
where x∗ = θ∗B − θ∗M + xF and xF is the free price relative preference. Let
N(R− T ;xF )
be the set of all Nash resort-tourist equilibria.
If S(θ∗B, θ
∗
M) ∈ N(T ;x) then ((θ∗B, θ∗M), S(θ∗B, θ∗M)) is an equilibrium price path strategy.
The deviation from the equilibrium price path of resort B is a strategy S(θB, θ
∗
M) for
every θB ∈ [0,+∞) \ {θ∗B}. Let IB(θ∗B) = (−∞, x∗ + θ∗B] \ {x∗}. The deviation of the
price relative preference with respect to resort B is
xB = θ
∗
B − θB + x∗, (2.3.3)
for xB ∈ IB(θ∗B). We note that if xB > x∗ + θ∗B, the price θB < 0 is not admissible as
a strategy for the resort B. The deviation from the equilibrium path of resort M is a
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strategy S(θ∗B, θM) for every θM ∈ [0,+∞)\{θ∗M}. Let IM(θ∗B) = [x∗−θ∗M ,+∞)\{x∗}.
The deviation of the price relative preference with respect to resort M is
xM = θM − θ∗M + x∗
for xM ∈ IM(θ∗M). We note that if xM < x∗ − θ∗M , the price θM < 0 is not admissible
as a strategy for the resort M.
Let IB = {(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M) : xB ∈ IB(θ∗B), θ∗B ≥ 0, θ∗M ≥ 0}, the isoprofit market share of
the beach resort hB : IB → R+0 is given by
hB(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) =
θ∗BSB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B + x∗ − xB
≥ 0.
We observe that hB(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M). Furthermore,
h′B(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) =
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B
≥ 0. and h′′B(x∗; θ∗B, θ∗M) =
2SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
(θ∗B)2
≥ 0.
(2.3.4)
Let IM = {(xM ; θ∗B, θ∗M) : xM ∈ IM(θ∗M), θ∗B ≥ 0, θ∗M ≥ 0}, the isoprofit market share
of the mountain resort hM : IM → R+0 is given by
hM(xM ; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) =
θ∗MSM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M + xM − x∗
≥ 0.
We observe that hM(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M). Furthermore,
h′M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = −
SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M
and h′′M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) =
2SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
(θ∗M)2
. (2.3.5)
Theorem 6 (Geometric resort best response). The price θ∗B of the resort B is the best
response to the price θ∗M of the resort M if, and only if, for every xB ∈ IB(θ∗B),
SB(x
∗ − xB + θ∗B, θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M).
The price θ∗M of the resort M is the best response to the price θ
∗
B of the resort B if,
and only if, for every xM ∈ IM(θ∗M),
SM(θ
∗
B, xM − x∗ + θ∗M) ≤ hM(xM ; θ∗B, θ∗M). (2.3.6)
Hence, the price θ∗B of the resort B is the best response to the price θ
∗
M of the resort
M if, and only if, the graph of SB is below the graph of hB. Similarly, the price θ
∗
M
of the resort M is the best response to the price θ∗B of the resort B if, and only if, the
graph of SM is below the graph of hM .
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Proof. The price θ∗B of the resort B is the best response to the price θ
∗
M of the resort
M if, and only if,
ΠB(θB;S(θB, θ
∗
M)) = θBSB(θB, θ
∗
M) ≤ θ∗BSB(θ∗B, θ∗M) = ΠB(θB;S(θB, θ∗M)). (2.3.7)
This is equivalent to
SB(θB, θ
∗
M) ≤
θ∗BSB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θB
.
By equality (2.3.3), xB + θB = θ
∗
B + x
∗. Hence 2.3.7 is equivalent to
SB(θB, θ
∗
M) ≤
θ∗BSB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B + x∗ − xB
= hB(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
The proof of inequality (2.3.6) follows similarly.
2.3.1 Nash equilibria
Given an equilibrium price path (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)), an out of equilibrium price tourist
N strategy S∗(θB, θM) is a tourist strategy with the following properties:
(i) S∗(θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);
(ii) for every xB ∈ IB(θ∗B),
S∗B(x
∗ − xB + θ∗B, θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M);
(iii) for every xM ∈ IM(θ∗M),
S∗M(θ
∗
B, xM − x∗ + θ∗M) ≤ hM(xM ; θ∗B, θ∗M).
Let O(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) be the set of all out of equilibrium price tourist N
strategies. Let S∗(θB, θM) be the following strategy:
(i) S∗(θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);
(ii) for every xB ∈ IB(θ∗B), S∗B(x∗ − xB + θ∗B, θ∗M) = 0;
(iii) for every xM ∈ IM(θ∗M), S∗M(θ∗B, xM − x∗ + θ∗M) = n.
Hence S∗(θB, θM) ∈ O(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ), and so
O(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
Using Theorem 6, we obtain the following remark.
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Remark 3 (Geometric resort Nash equilibria N(R−T, xF )). A resort-tourist strategy
(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ N(R− T, xF ) if, and only if,
1. (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is an equilibrium price path; and
2. S ∈ O(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ).
Furthermore,
O(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
A resort-tourist deviation impartial strategy ((θ′B, θ
′
M);S
+(θB, θM)) ∈ S(R) is a resort-
tourist strategy with the property that
S+(θB, θM) = S(θB − θM).
Let S+(R) ⊂ S(R) be the set of all resort-tourist deviation impartial strategies. Let
N+(R− T ;xF ) = S+(R) ∩N(R− T ;xF ).
A N+ equilibrium price path (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)) is an equilibrium price with the
property that
SB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
θ∗B
=
SM(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
θ∗M
=
n
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
. (2.3.8)
Furthermore,
ΠB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
(θ∗B)2
=
ΠM(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
(θ∗M)2
=
n
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
.
The auxiliar isoprofit market share of the mountain resort hM : IM → R is given by
hM(xM ; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) = n− hM(xM ; θ∗B, θ∗M) =
n(xM − x∗) + θ∗MSB(θ∗B, θ∗M)
θ∗M + xM − x∗
.
We observe that hM(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M). Furthermore,
h′M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) =
SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M
≥ 0 and h′′M(x∗; θ∗B, θ∗M) = −
2SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
(θ∗M)2
≤ 0.
(2.3.9)
We note that equality (2.3.8) is equivalent to
h′B(x
∗, θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = h
′
M(x
∗, θ∗B, θ
∗
M).
Given an equilibrium price path (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)), an out of equilibrium price
tourist N+ strategy S∗ is a tourist strategy with the following properties:
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(i)
S∗(θ∗B − θ∗M) = S(θ∗B − θ∗M);
(ii) for every xB ∈ K = IB(θ∗B) ∩ IM(θ∗M),
hM(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤ SB(x∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M);
(iii) for every xM ∈ IM(θ∗M) \K,
hM(xM ; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤ SB(θ∗B, xM − x∗ + θ∗M).
(iv) for every xB ∈ IB(θ∗B) \K,
SB(x
∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M);
Let O+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M);xF ) be the set of all out of equilibrium price tourist Nash
N+ strategies
Theorem 7 (Geometric resort Nash equilibria N+(R − T ;xF )). A resort-tourist
strategy (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ N+(R− T ;xF ) if, and only if,
1. (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is an N
+ equilibrium price path; and
2. S ∈ O+(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ).
Furthermore,
O+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
Proof. By theorem 6, if (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ N+(R−T ;xF ) then for every xB ∈ K =
IB(θ
∗
B) ∩ IM(θ∗M), we have
hM(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤ SB(x∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M). (2.3.10)
We note that
hM(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = hB(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = SB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M).
If
h′M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) 6= h′B(x∗; θ∗B, θ∗M)
then
hM(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) > hB(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
CHAPTER 2. TOURISTS AND RESORTS GAME 36
either for xB < x
∗ or for xB > x∗. Hence, there is no strategy SB(x∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M)
satisfying (2.3.10). Therefore,
h′B(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = h
′
M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M)
is a necessary condition. Hence,
SB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)(θ∗B)−1 = SM(θ∗B − θ∗M)(θ∗M)−1.
Therefore, θ∗MSB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M) = θ∗B(n− SB(θ∗B − θ∗M)). Thus,
SB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M) =
θ∗Bn
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
.
Hence, (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is an N
+ equilibrium price path. Since h′′M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) < 0
and h′′B(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = SB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M) > 0, we obtain
O+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
Therefore, this theorem follows from theorem 6.
In figure 2.6 is depicted a geometric ilustration of theorem 7.
Fix S∗B ∈ [l, l + k]. Assume that
S∗B = l +
k(θ∗B − θ∗M + xF − T (l))
−A(k − 1) .
Let S∗M = n− S∗B.
Lemma 6. If (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is an N
+ equilibrium price path then
θ∗B = S
∗
Bθ
∗
M(S
∗
M)
−1 and θ∗M = S
∗
Mθ
∗
B(S
∗
B)
−1.
Furthermore,
xF = −A(k − 1)pS − θ∗B + θ∗M + T (l).
1. If S∗M ≤ N/2 then xF ≤ −A(k − 1)pS + T (l).
2. If S∗M ≥ N/2 then xF ≥ −A(k − 1)pS + T (l).
Proof. Since S∗B = θ
∗
Bn(θ
∗
B+θ
∗
M)
−1, we get θ∗B = S
∗
Bθ
∗
M(S
∗
M)
−1 and θ∗M = S
∗
Mθ
∗
B(S
∗
B)
−1.
By theorem 4,
S∗B = l +
k(θ∗B − θ∗M + xF − T (l))
−A(k − 1) .
CHAPTER 2. TOURISTS AND RESORTS GAME 37
x*
HB
VB
OB
SB
1
n
*
HB
VB
OB
SB
1
hB
hM
yl,k
x
Figure 2.6: Geometric ilustration of theorem 7
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Therefore,
xF = −A(k − 1)(S∗B − l)k−1 − θ∗B + θ∗M + T (l). (2.3.11)
Puting together (2.3.11) and θ∗M = S
∗
Mθ
∗
B(S
∗
B)
−1,
(1− S∗M(S∗B)−1)θ∗B = −A(k − 1)(S∗B − l)k−1 + T (l)− xF .
If S∗M ≤ N/2 then xF ≤ −A(k − 1)(S∗B − l)k−1 + T (l). If S∗M ≥ N/2 then xF ≥
−A(k − 1)(S∗B − l)k−1 + T (l).
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Figure 2.7: The competitive equilibrium when A > 0.
2.3.2 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
A subgame-perfect Nash resort-tourist equilibrium ((θ∗B, θ
∗
M);S(θB, θM)) is a Nash resort-
tourist equilibrium with the property that S(θB, θM) ∈ N(T ) for every resort price
strategy (θB, θM). Let PN(R;xF ) be the set of all subgame-perfect Nash resort-tourist
equilibria.
Throughout we will prove the following results:
Lemma 7. Let A > 0. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for tourists impartial strategies
is either a monopoly or a competitive equilibrium where resorts have zero profits.
Theorem 8. Let A ≤ 0. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for tourists impartial strategies
is
(i) a monopoly if xF /∈ [T (0) + A(n− 1), T (n)− A(n− 1)];
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(ii) a competitive equilibrium if xF ∈ [T (0) + A(n− 1), T (n)− A(n− 1)].
Furthermore we will characterize preferences and prices for each equilibria.
Let A ≤ 0. The deviation from the equilibrium path of resort B is a strategy S(θB, θ∗M)
for every θB ∈ [0, x∗ + θ∗B − T (0)) \ {θ∗B}. Let
JAB (θ
∗
B) = [T (0), x
∗ + θ∗B] \ {x∗}.
The deviation tourists price relative preference with respect of resort B is
xB = θ
∗
B − θB + x∗
for xB ∈ JAB (θ∗B). We note that if xB ≤ T (0), there is only one Nash equilibrium
strategy S and SB = 0, so there are no tourists choosing resortB at a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, if A > 0, we define
JAB (θ
∗
B) = [T (n), x
∗ + θ∗B] \ {x∗}.
We note that if xB < T (n), there is only one Nash equilibrium strategy S and SB = 0,
so there are no tourists choosing resort B at a Nash equilibrium.
Let A ≤ 0. The deviation from the equilibrium path of resort M is a strategy S(θ∗B, θM)
for every θM ∈ [0, T ′(n) + θ∗M − x∗) \ {θ∗M}. Let
JAM(θ
∗
B) = [x
∗ − θ∗M , T ′(n)] \ {x∗}.
The deviation from the equilibrium path of resort M tourists relative preference is
xM = θM − θ∗M + x∗
for xM ∈ JAM(θ∗M). We note that if xM ≥ T ′(n) there is only one Nash equilibrium
strategy S and SM = 0, so there are no tourists choosing resort M at a Nash
equilibrium.
Similarly, if A > 0, we define
JAM(θ
∗
B) = [x
∗ − θ∗M , T ′(0)] \ {θ∗M}.
We note that if xB > T
′(0), there is only one Nash equilibrium strategy S and SB = 0,
so there are no tourists choosing resort B at a Nash equilibrium.
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An out of equilibrium price PN tourist strategy S∗ is a tourist strategy with the
following properties: (i) for every xB ∈ JAB (θ∗B), S(θ∗B, θ∗M) is a Nash equilibrium and
FAB ∩ ({xB} × [0, hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M)]) 6= ∅;
(ii) for every xM ∈ JAM(θ∗M), S(θ∗B, θ∗M) is a Nash equilibrium and
FAM ∩ ({xM} × [0, hM(xM ; θ∗B, θ∗M)]) 6= ∅.
Let
OP(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF )
be the set of all out of equilibrium price tourist PN strategies.
Theorems 6 and 2 imply the following result.
Remark 4 (Geometric resort subgame-perfect Nash equilibria PN(R − T ;xF )). A
resort-tourist strategy (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ PN(R− T ;xF ) if, and only if,
1. (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is a equilibrium price path; and
2. S ∈ OP(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ).
OP(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
A PCN equilibrium price path (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is an equilibrium price with the
following property: There are l′ ≤ l and k′ ≤ k such that SB(θ∗B, θ∗M) = yl,k(x∗) =
yl′,k′(x
∗),
k
−A(k − 1) ≤
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B
≤ k
′
−A(k′ − 1)
and
k
−A(k − 1) ≤
SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M
≤ k
′
−A(k′ − 1) .
One of the fibers has to be obliquous but the other one can be horizontal (k=0). We
note that the market share fibers OBl,k and O
B
l′,k′ can be the same.
An out of equilibrium price PCN tourist strategy S∗ is a continuous out of equilibrium
price PN tourist strategy. Let OPC(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) be the set of all out of
equilibrium price tourist PCN strategies. If A > 0 then there is only one obliquous
fiber OB0,n and OPC(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) = ∅
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Theorem 9 (Geometric resort subgame-perfect Nash equilibria PCN(R − T ;xF )).
Let A ≤ 0. A resort-tourist strategy (θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ PCN(R − T ;xF ) if, and
only if,
1. (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is a PCN equilibrium price path; and
2. S ∈ OPC(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ).
Furthermore,
OPC(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
Proof. If a resort-tourist strategy (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ PCN(R− T ;xF ) the tourists
strategy has to belong to the market share fiber FB, i.e.
FB ∩ ({xB} × [0, hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M)]) 6= ∅.
We note that
k
−A(k − 1) ≤
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B
≤ k
′
−A(k′ − 1)
is equivalent to
k
−A(k − 1) ≤ h
′
B(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤
k′
−A(k′ − 1) .
Hence, the Nash tourists strategies in the fiber OBl′,k′ with higher slope, for xB ≤ x∗B,
and the Nash tourists strategies in the fiber OBl,k with smaller slope, for xB ≥ x∗B give
lower profit to resort B than S(θ∗B, θ
∗
M). Similarly, the Nash tourists strategies in the
fiberOBl,k, for xM ≤ x∗M , and the Nash tourists strategies in the fiberOBl′,k′ , for xM ≥ x∗M
give lower profit to resort M than S(θ∗B, θ
∗
M). Hence, OPC(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
The other equivalences follow from Theorem 6.
Let
E =
l′k − k′l
k − k′ .
Remark 5. If (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is a PCN equilibrium price path and (l, k) 6= (l′, k′)
then
S(θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = l +
k(l − l′)
(k′ − k) = l
′ +
k′(l − l′)
(k′ − k)
occurs for the crossing point of the tourists relative preference x∗ = x(l, k; l′, k′) ∈
[T (l), T ′(l + k)] given by
x∗ =
−A(k − 1)(l − l′)
(k′ − k) − T (l) =
−A(k′ − 1)(l − l′)
(k′ − k) − T (l
′)
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−A(k′ − 1)E
k′
≤ θ∗B ≤
−A(k − 1)E
k
−A(k′ − 1)(n− E)
k′
≤ θ∗M ≤
−A(k − 1)(n− E)
k
Since θ∗M − θ∗B = xF − x∗, the above remark gives a lower and upper bound for xF
−A(k′ − 1)n
k′
+
−AE(k + k′)
kk′
≤ xF − x∗ ≤ −A(k − 1)n
k
+
−AE(k + k′)
kk′
.
Furthermore, if (l, k) = (l′, k′) then
xF =
−A(k − 1)n
k
+ x∗.
Let
PN+(R;xF ) = S
+(R) ∩PN(R;xF )
be the set of all resort-tourist deviation impartial strategies that are subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria.
A PN+ equilibrium price path (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)) is an equilibrium price with the
following property for some l ≥ 0 and k ≥ 1: SB(θ∗B, θ∗M) = yl,k(x∗),
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B
=
SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M
=
n
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
=
k
−A(k − 1) .
Furthermore,
ΠB(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
(θ∗B)2
=
ΠM(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)
(θ∗M)2
=
n
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
=
k
−A(k − 1) .
An out of equilibrium price tourist PN+ strategy S∗ is Nash equilibria tourist strategy
with the following properties:
(i) S∗(θ∗B − θ∗M) = S(θ∗B − θ∗M);
(ii) for every xB ∈ K1 = JAB (θ∗B) ∩ JAM(θ∗M),
hM(xB; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤ SB(x∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M);
(iii) for every xM ∈ JAM(θ∗M) \K1,
hM(xM ; θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) ≤ SB(θ∗B, xM − x∗ + θ∗M).
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(iv) for every xB ∈ JAB (θ∗B) \K1,
SB(x
∗ − xB + θ∗B − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M);
Let OP+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B−θ∗M);xF ) be the set of all out of equilibrium price tourist Nash
PN+ strategies.
Theorem 10 (Geometric resort subgame-perfect Nash equilibria PN+(R − T ;xF )).
A resort-tourist strategy (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θB, θM)) ∈ PN+(R− T ;xF ) if, and only if,
1. (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)) is a PN
+ equilibrium price path; and
2. S ∈ OP+(θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θ∗B, θ∗M);xF ).
Furthermore,
OP+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Similarly to theorem 7, O+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) 6= ∅ if, and only if,
h′B(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) = h
′
M(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M)
Furthermore,
h′B(x
∗; θ∗B, θ
∗
M) =
k
−A(k − 1) .
Hence,
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗B
=
SM(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M)
θ∗M
=
n
θ∗B + θ
∗
M
=
k
−A(k − 1) . (2.3.12)
An example of an out of equilibrium price tourist strategy consists in the following
strategy: for x − x∗ ≥ 0 follow the segment lines of the fiber at each crossing whose
derivative of h increases but the less possible; for x∗ − x ≥ 0 follow the segment lines
of the fiber at each crossing whose derivative of h decreases but the less possible.
Let σ1 = (θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)) be a PN+ equilibrium price path. Let the σ1 out of
equilibrium price tourist Nash PN+ strategy be given by
(i) S(θ∗B − θ∗M) = n;
(ii) if x ≤ x∗ then S∗(θ∗B − θM) = n;
(iii) if x > x∗ then S∗(θB − θ∗M) ≤ hB(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M).
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Let σ2 = (θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)) be a PN+ equilibrium price path. Let the σ2 out of
equilibrium price tourist Nash PN+ strategy be given by
(i) S(θ∗B − θ∗M) = n;
(ii) if x < x∗ then S(θ∗B − θM) = 0;
(iii) if x > x∗ then S(θB − θ∗M) ≥ hM(xB; θ∗B, θ∗M).
Let σ3(s
∗) = (θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B − θ∗M)) be a PN+ equilibrium price path. Let the σ3(s∗)
out of equilibrium price tourist Nash PN+ strategy be given by
(i) S(θ∗B − θ∗M) = s∗;
(ii) if xF < x
∗ then S(θ∗B − θM) = 0;
(iii) if xF > x
∗ then S(θB − θ∗M) = n.
Remark 6. Let A > 0. We have
(i) σ1 is a monopoly for resort B if θB = xF − x∗ and θM = 0;
(ii) σ2 is a monopoly for resort M if θM = x
∗ − xF and θB = 0;
(iii) for every s∗ ∈ [0, n], σ3(s∗) is a competive equilibrium where θ∗B = θ∗M = 0.
Furthermore,
OP+(θ∗B, θ
∗
M , S(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M);xF ) = {σ1, σ2, σ3(s∗) : s∗ ∈ [0, n]}.
Remark 7. Let A < 0 and let Spure = (θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M , S(θB−θM)) be a tourist-resort strategy
such that the out of equilibrium price tourist Nash PN+ strategies S(θB − θM) consist
in pure strategies that are Nash equilibria.
(i) Let xF ≤ T (0)+A(n−1). If θ∗M = T (0)−xF and θ∗B = 0, then the resort-tourist
strategy Spure is a PN
+ Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Let T (0) +A(n− 1) ≤ xF ≤ T (n)−A(n− 1). The resort-tourist strategies Spure
are not PN+ Nash equilibria.
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(iii) Let xF ≥ T (n)−A(n−1). If θ∗M = 0 and θ∗B = xF −T (n), then the resort-tourist
strategy Spure is a PN
+ Nash equilibrium.
Let c(l, k) = T (0) + A(n− k−1(l + 1)).
Theorem 11. Let A ≤ 0 and k > 1. If a resort-tourist strategy (θ∗B, θ∗M , S(θB, θM)) ∈
PN+(R− T ;xF ) then
c(l, k) ≤ xF ≤ c(l, k)− 3An(k − 1)k−1
Furthermore,
(i)
θ∗B =
−A(k − 1)(n+ l) + k(xF − T (l))
3k
;
(ii)
θ∗M =
−A(k − 1)(2n− l) + k(T (l)− xF )
3k
;
(iii)
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) =
n+ l + k(xF − T (l))
3
;
Proof. Since
SB = l +
k(x∗ − T (l))
−A(k − 1)
Using equation (2.3.12) we get
−A(k − 1)l + k(θ∗B − θ∗M + (xF − T (l)))
−A(k − 1) =
k
−A(k − 1) · θ
∗
B.
Therefore,
θ∗B =
−A(k − 1)l + k(xF − T (l) + θ∗M)
2k
On the other hand, again by (2.3.12),
θ∗B + θ
∗
M =
−A(k − 1)n
k
.
Hence, θ∗B and θ
∗
M are as presented above. Since
SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) =
θ∗Bk
−A(k − 1)
we get SB(θ
∗
B, θ
∗
M) as presented above.
The restricions θ∗B ≥ 0 and θ∗M ≥ 0 lead to
c(l, k) ≤ xF ≤ c(l, k)− 3An(k − 1)k−1
References
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